Silence

Gayatri Spivak's essay brings up questions about silence. How are subjects of oppression silenced? How are people kept silent, and how can a subaltern (even if not a true subaltern) like Bhubaneswari Bhaduri be "made to unspeak herself posthumously" (Spivak 803)?

Spivak discusses social class in terms of dominance and subalternity, heterogeneity and homogeneity, but I have found little that makes mention of the criteria that must be met in order to have the power to silence others, even those who do not speak verbally? "Bhubaneswari attempted to 'speak' by turning her body into a text of women/writing," compensating for her unserviceable voice, but "in her own family, among women, in no more than fifty years, her attempt failed" (807). In those fifty years, what power was granted to "her own emancipated granddaughters" -- participants in what Spivak calls "a new mainstream" -- that made them eligible for silencing Bhaduri?

Or is the silencing of an oppressed group less an act of vindication for the dominant group and more a failure of comprehension? Spivak contends, "All speaking, even seemingly the most immediate, entails a distanced decipherment by another, which is, at best, an interception. That is what speaking is" (808). Whether defensive interception against speech or inadvertent failure to interpret speech, discovering the reasons behind acts of silencing may be a viable means of inserting the subaltern "into the long road to hegemony" (Spivak 808).

The Big Questions

In the book "Gender Trouble" Judith Butler presents us with many questions. What/who is a "woman"? What/who is a "man"? Are these terms opposite and oppositional to one another? Are these terms binary (ie If we are not one does it mean we are the other)? The reason she is working with these questions is that she has an interest in the idea of Feminism. So she begins by wondering is "Women" should really the subject of feminism, and if so what is the "woman" that feminism is describing? This she states is really the big questions for her, because she does not believe that all women really feel as if feminism represents them. She claims that to say that feminism is representative of all women is to not take into account the spectrum of womanhood and is to create a new kind of Hegemonic Womanhood.

This I feel is one place where Butler intersects with Spivak who is in her own way concerned with the idea of Hegemony, especially, in her case, with Imperial Hegemony. The idea that as the "elite" we have the write to dominate or forcibly incorporate the "other." This is feel is what Judith Butler is really trying to avoid. She does not want feminism to become some kind of gender conqueror that either destroys of folds in all the women of the world into the main idea of feminism. I think that she wants the different, as she puts it, "cross sections" of femininity such as race, ethnicity, sexuality, society of origin, and even age to have a unique and shining voice in the spectrum of feminism.

Social Media as Panopticon: Breaking Frames

I recently read an article by Canadian writer and law professor Joel Bakan in the magazine Adbusters, entitled simply "Panipticon." In in, Bakan presents social media as a Panopticon of sorts, where, as Mark Zuckerberg says, "people influence people" (as opposed to, say, ideological state apparatuses like churches and schools influencing people). This seems obvious enough, but Bakan takes his argument further, focusing on the marketing aspect of social media like Facebook. He writes, "Users become 'fans' and 'friends' of brands, and get their friends to do the same," the result being that "Marketing as marketing disappears." Here is where I think Bakan's argument gets interesting: he writes, "Boundaries are broken down between marketers and kids (as kids market to each other); between content and advertising (as advertising now infuses, rather than interrupts, content); and between kids' lives and entertainment (as their lives now become the content of that entertainment)." So the Panopticon involves the breakdown of frames, including the frames of roles (here I'm thinking guard=author, prisoner=reader).

Though I don't think 'kids' are the only ones taking part in this marketing-less marketing, I think it's really interesting how, as Bakan points out, power relations are Panopticon-ized by Facebook and other social media (GooglePlus? No clue, I don't even have a Facebook...). "Kids, like the prisoners in the Panopticon, now bear the power marketing holds over them, and the marketers, like the Panopticon's guards, drop from view, their power now automatic and self-executing, all the greater for its invisibility."

Bakan's argument, and the notion of the Panopticon itself, complicate notions of author role and reader role. The Author can (and does) still hold power when invisible, and perhaps holds the most power when invisible. Think about stories without known authors; perhaps these unknown authors seem even more infallible than their known counterparts because we can't contextualize the work within their identity. They seem more objective. And I think an argument could be made paralleling hypertext and the Panopticon, where the readers can, to a certain extent, take on the author role as well.

Audience Construction in "Anonymous"

Coming off of this Thanksgiving break, and knowing that you are all English people, I feel required to recommend that you all go see the movie Anonymous, if you haven’t already. At risk of sounding like a complete nerd, I am not embarrassed to say that I left the theatre, sat down in my friend’s car and immediately said that I needed to blog. The film presents the life of Shakespeare in an alternate view, contrary to the way the majority of us were taught (I’m assuming). Of course there has always been talk of William Shakespeare not being the truth author of the many famous works; however, at least for me, I have never been presented with so much factual evidence in such an entertaining manner.

Anyway, as the movie began and characters appeared, right away I was struck by the way in which the director chose to construct the audience. The scene is set with you, the viewer, as an audience member in a circle theatre. So, essentially, you’re going to be watching a movie of people watching a play; however, it is structured so that the first sililioque is directly received. Flashback: I feel that this is a great example of Ong’s theories of audience construction and distinguishing the implied and actual audience. In this case, the implied audience would be those in the Shakespeare theatre, but the actual audience were those of us in the movie theatre. This continues throughout the entire film until the conclusion where the same actor addresses his audience and the camera remains filming while the people in both theaters perform the same actions: stand up, speak to their neighbor, get their coats, and proceed out of the building. Ong states, “A history of the way audiences have been called on to fictionalize themselves would be a correlative of literary genres and literary works, and indeed culture itself” (Ong 12). In this case, I feel that this could be an accurate explanation for why the audience was constructed as such. Because the director wanted to portray a certain feeling, or atmosphere, he was able to create his audience into the same type of person, with similar interests; while also drawing attention to the most important aspect of the film: Shakespeare’s works, and most notably his plays.

What’s more, after watching the movie and considering the claims that were made, it was interesting to me that my opinion of the works changed based on who I thought created them. Ong also mentions that, “If the writer succeeds in writing, it is generally because he can fictionalize in his imagination an audience he has learned to know…in their imagination” (Ong 11). So, when applied to the facts presented in the movie with regards to the actual author, in a way, it changes the learned meanings of the poems or plays because they first presented with a different author, and therefore a different imagination and intended audience. I guess that kind of leads us back to our first paradox, does the author have agency over the way in which his or her texts are interpreted? How much of that interpretation is tied to the reader’s prior knowledge of the author? Just something to think about, and not a bad way to spend dollars if you feel the urge.

The Subaltern and Hegemony

Throughout “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” Gayatri Spivak mentions the idea of hegemony, as well as the hegemonic influence on society which influences the subaltern. I personally understood the term to mean the accepted norms of a particular community or society that do not necessarily have a legitimate basis; however, in order to understand Spivak’s article more clearly, I looked up a more formal definition. The Bedford Glossary provides the following reference: hegemony is “the dominance or dominant influence of one nation, group, or class over another…especially ideological and cultural manipulation and control” (221). I feel that this is incredibly important to consider when reading the article, specifically in terms of the classification of people. For example, it is noted that, there is a clear separation between, and acknowledgment of, “the demographic difference between the total Indian population and all those whom we have described as the ‘elite’” (Spivak 802). Here, the reader is forced to consider what the qualities or factors are that make a certain person, group of people, appear to be more ‘ideal’ than others. The simple and most immediate answer is most likely that the elite have, among other things, more material possessions and overall opportunities. However, this idea can be complicated when one wonders about who has been designated the ability and power to determine such a seemingly finite division amongst people. In this case, the only reasonable explanation is the definition of hegemony provided in the glossary. The Indian “elite” were decided solely on the overall opinion of society based on culture and a history of acceptance. This is further exemplified in the story at the Spivak’s article. Even though Bhubaneswari committed suicide as an attempt to demonstrate her political view and support, because she was a woman, her intentions were misinterpreted, against all of her efforts, based on the history of the culture. So, despite her “attempt to ‘speak’ by turning her body into a text of woman/writing” she was unsuccessful in conveying her true point because of her role in a hegemonic society (Spivak 807). After building her argument and disclosing this story, Spivak is able to claim at the end of the article that, “the subaltern cannot speak!” (Spivak 807).

Spivak and Global Feminism

I think a paramount concern for feminism today is figuring out how to address oppression globally. I am thinking of genital cutting (or genital mutilation depending on who you are talking to) and the practice of suttee in India, which Spivak speaks briefly about in this essay, but was a foundational piece of her original essay by the same title. We (Americans, Western women, academics, etc.) may see genital cutting in Africa as an atrocity to womankind, and may not be able to imagine why a woman would throw herself on her husband’s funeral pyre. What often, if not inevitably, follows after learning about practices such as genital cutting and suttee is self-righteous indignation. How could they possibly be subjected to such treatment? Do they HATE women over there? Papers are written about the women’s treatment, horror stories are shared, and maybe even the general public gets in on the action, signing petitions calling for those with power to “do something” to correct such wrongs.

What inevitably happens, though, is women from Africa, or India, or whatever non-Western nation we are focusing on speak out against our meddling in their business. These are sacred practices, they say. These are rituals that have been performed for generations, and are integral to our culture and way of life. Here is where it becomes more complicated for the Western feminist, whose only intention was to help a fellow-oppressed group. It is here that the question of whether the subaltern can speak really becomes important, and I think it is a question global politics demands an answer to.

How can those from the outside, (namely the West in this case) ever hope to truly act on behalf of the women from Africa, or India, or anywhere else for that matter? How is making a petition to get the powers that be to put pressure on nations to end genital cutting helping to empower the women of Africa? I’m not arguing that the practice isn’t heinous—I think it’s awful and am happy to see a movement to end it—but I think a top-down approach to ending a cultural practice is in some ways equally as oppressive as the practice itself. I think this is the problem Spivak is putting words to.

Judith Butler and Representation

· Representation- (2)

- “Serves as the operative term within a political process that seeks to extend visibility and legitimacy to women as political subjects” (2)

- “Normative function of a language which is said either to reveal or to distort what is assumed to be true about the category of women” (2)

Butler recognizes that the first problem tackled by feminists was one of visibility. This makes sense, since the discourse it was attempting to destabilize was one that first saw male and female bodies as inversions of the same thing. 19^th and 20^th century feminists had to address a society that treated men as the normal, the marked category. Women, in many ways, were defined by what men were not.

An example that illustrates this would be the understanding of male and female genitalia. Scientists recognized that both sets of genitalia were composed of the same tissue, and it was concluded that women’s genitals were inverted penises and scrotums. Read fallopian tubes for testicles and vagina for penis. In this type of environment it would have been critical for feminists to establish “woman” as something distinct from men in order to construct their identities as equals.

I have a hard time putting this idea in to words, (which makes me feel better about having difficulty following Butler sometimes) but I think it is one that is paramount to current feminist struggles. Woman was first defined in terms that pinned her with or against man, and these terms--this representation--was how woman saw herself and learned to define herself as. As women became more publicly active in resisting this definition, they aimed to redefine themselves, but had to still identify themselves within a patriarchal context. I think this is the crux of identity politics, because in order to change how people see you, you must appeal to the way they see you in terms they know and understand.

Judith Butler and Juridical Systems of Power

Juridical Systems of Power

- “…produce the subjects they subsequently come to represent,” (2)

- Appear to regulate political life in purely negative terms (2-3)

§ Limitation

§ Prohibition

§ Regulation

§ Control

§ Protection

...of the individual via choice

Following Foucault’s analysis of juridical systems of power, it seems that Butler is pointing out that in order to emancipate “woman” from the patriarchal political system, we must define woman inside the very same system. It seems like she is making a point towards readability, in that in order to make a call for respect of whatever it is that is agreed upon to mean womanhood, it must be defined in terms that make it digestible in the current patriarchal system.

This reminds me of the current gay-marriage debate. Many gay rights activists have chosen marriage as a platform to represent equality because many gay couples have been prevented from living the lives they want. By this I mean people want to be able to visit their partner in the hospital, want to be able to share their partner’s last name, and want to be given the same tax breaks as heterosexual couples. The problem with this logic, as I think Butler might agree (although I don’t know for sure) is that requires gay couples to define themselves in terms of traditional, hegemonic straight culture. This becomes problematic because it does not address the root of the problem, in that people should be able to live their lives the way they see best, which involves the constructing of one’s family. Gay marriage does not help the straight/gay/queer etc. person that does not live a lifestyle that neatly conforms to the current heteronormative one prescribed to us.

I think this relates to Butler because I think she is noting the problem of having a singular subject (woman) be what feminism represents. This requires then that any female-bodied person be readable to the world in a particular way. I think she is pointing out that feminism, at the time she is writing, was far too uniform in how it chose to represent women. Butler posits that, “If one ‘is’ a woman, that is surely not all one is; the term fails to be exhaustive… because gender is not always constituted coherently or consistently in different historical contexts, and because gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional modalitites of discursively constituted identities,” (4). Here Butler incorporates what black feminists have been proclaiming for decades: identity is not singular and not uniform. While intersectionality as a feminist approach is not explicitly named here, it is certainly being alluded to. If intersectionality is not Butler’s point, I certainly think it is an axiom she builds upon throughout her paper.

Tommy and the Hawks Support Butler

Two different articles from the New York Times support what
Butler writes about gender:

One article, talking about how males of certain species of bird
approximate female characteristics (in this case, to attract other
males in order to stay warm) brought to mind what Butler said about
gender not being binary. "Assuming for the moment the stability
of binary sex, it does not follow that the construction of "men"
will accrure exclusively to the bodies of males or that "women" will
interpret only female bodies" (p. 9).

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/science/male-hawks-in-france-find-more-than-their-feminine-side.html

More apt was a quote I associated with a story of a man from
a traditional Itailan family who has made a living from his
impersonation of Judy Garland: "If one "is" a woman. that is surely
not all one is; the term fails to be exhaustive, not because a pregendered
"person" transcends the specific paraphernaila of its gender,
but because gender is not always constituted coherently or
consistently ....and because gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic,
sexual... identities" (p. 4).

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/nyregion/judy-garland-impersonator-tommy-femia-of-brooklyn.html?pagewanted=all

Diana, Benjamin, Metis, and Aura

A link on MSN to "Ten Dresses We'll Never Forget" helped me explain Benjamin's concept of "aura" to myself.I clicked, and among the dresses chosen as epic was a short, off-the-shoulder black velvet dress Diana, Princess of Wales wore on the evening Prince Charles admitted infidelity on British television.

Clothing helped me conceptualize aura as the "shell" ("to pry an object from it's shell, to destroy its' aura...(p. 1236)) of presence surrounding a piece based on a moment in time and on the essence of the artist extended in the piece itself:

The dress Diana wore on that particular evening was off the rack,
so it was mechanically reproduced, but much more went into the "moment,"
so that it can't technically be reproduced. No model is exactly like Diana, and
even if someone made themselves up to impersonate her, still, her essence
(what K.K. Campbell might refer to as "techne" or
"metis" (Campell, p. 6)) can't be exactly replicated and are components of "aura" as well.

Even if a performing artist wore the same dress and accessorized it with,
say, Converse high-tops and striped socks, to some, the dress would still be remembered from its "original" context and seen as only a part of a different statement.("technical repreduction can put the copy of the original into situations which would be out of reach for the original itself" (p. 1235)...and yet, "It is significant that the existence of the work of art with reference to its aura is never entirely separated from its ritual (our habitual) function (association) "(p. 1236)).

I'm taking this to say that, no matter how close we get to a reproduction
or even to an original, a work or a piece of art will for a long time maintain an unbreachable distance based on the "moment" in time for which it is known in culture, and on the personal essence (creative aspects, flair) with which the artist infuses it.

Idea of reality in Burke's "Terministic Screens"

             In his understanding of how the “terministic screen” directs attention, Burke writes, “Even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a deflection of reality” (45).   Through this idea, one understands reality as a spectrum of symbols and through each specific screen – or terminology system –, specific symbols are seen as having different meanings and interacting in different ways to affect interpretation, or attention.   In Burke’s third section, “Examples,” he cites his first chapter: “…however important to us is the tiny sliver of reality each of us has experienced firsthand, the whole overall “picture” is but a construct of our symbol systems” (48).  This frightening truth, Burke claims, is “much like peering over the edge of things into an ultimate abyss” because it forces one to consider the world without a screen or an inherently intentional viewpoint.  Thus, Burke writes that “though man is typically the symbol-using animal, he clings to a kind of naïve verbal realism that refuses to let him realize the full extent of the role played by symbolicity in his notions of reality,” for to profoundly consider the role of each symbol would force one to consider the alternate realities of alternate terministic screens and thus consider the destabilization of the symbol, an absence of one, true reality (48).  Such an idea of truth possesses people and, so, is what makes the “selection” of reality so essential.  Thus, Burke’s question:  “Would not a terminology that features the unconscious repression of ideas automatically deflect our attention from symbols that are not repressed but merely remote?” (51).  These “remote symbols” merely belong to another symbol system, or terministic reality, but because one’s attention is deflected from them, each screen can be considered as having intention and trapping one within that reality.   

A World Lens

Burke's "Terministic Screens" talks about how a person has their own frame of reference, symbols they use for interpreting the world around them. Because of this, words and thoughts would be hard pressed to be objective because any interpretation will be subjective. He says "any nomenclature necessarily directs the attention into some channels rather than others" (45). That means then one person may see something and go down thought Pathway A and another may see the exact same thing but end up at Pathway B. To me this complicates an artist's original intent with their work. If all thoughts are subjective, seen through these screens, how can a person see the artist's true intent if what the viewer gets out of it is completely up to them? The artist could literally say what their work is about but that diminishes its power. I see this all the time in poetry. An author from the 18th century or the 19th century writes something and in class discussion, there is no consensus to what the line means. Since the person is dead, they cannot be there to say exactly what they mean. But this to me isn't a bad thing. It allows for more than what the author intended. It allows for works to be interpreted in different ways, thus allowing it to be relevant even in modern times.

The Necessity of Terministic Screens

While reading through Burke’s “Terministic Screens,” it became clear to me that the presence of these screens are not only present in aspects of everyday life but in fact essential to speech communication and interpretations. As Burke mentions, “we must use terministic screens, since we can’t say anything without the use of terms; whatever terms we use, they necessarily constitute a corresponding kind of screen; and any such screen necessarily directs the attention to one field rather than another” (Burke 50). Based on this claim, it is possible to believe that when attempting to explain a thought, or portray an idea, it is completely inevitable that the speaker will present the issue based on his or her personal knowledge of terms and related experiences; therefore, when speaking, the terms used will undoubtedly direct the attention and thinking pattern of the listener and determine the following interpretation.

In order to help grasp this concept, Burke provides us with an example about photographs, he notes: “They were different photographs of the same objects” yet “they revealed notable distinctions in texture, and even in form, depending upon which color filter was used” (Burke 45). By applying this situation to the idea of terministic screens, it becomes easier to recognize how original copies of anything can be interpreted in different manners and result in an entirely different understanding. This then made me wonder about a claim made in “Art in the Age of Mechanical Reasoning,” Benjamin states that, “The presence of the original is the prerequisite of the concept of authenticity” (Benjamin 1234). So, in relation to Burke’s photograph situation as well as terministic screens, it seems that having knowledge of an original thought is required in order to discuss it; however, if one were to use terms biased to a particular culture or belief, would that person be altering the original, and consequentially hinder its authenticity?

Aura

We have tried and tried to define Aura in our limited class section, and it is something that I think about a lot outside of class. I would venture a definition and how this interpretation of Aura works in this essay. Aura is not art. Aura one way in which we describe our ritual worship of art. Aura is the power that art holds over us, its command presence if you will. In the mechanical reproduction of art, we are taking away the aura because you cannot have multiple objects with great command presence. Instead of one great piece of art, we have several ok pieces of art, and they are only ok because there are multiple of them. Several voices do not have the same authority over the audience that one, loud booming voice does. But several voices can be moved about and have some sort of effect on an audience that would otherwise not be able to hear it.
There's a quote in Benjamin that has yet to be brought up in class that would alter everyone's way of thinking considerably. "Namely, the desire of contemporary masses to bring things "closer" spatially and humanly, which is just as ardent as their bent toward overcoming the uniqueness of every reality by accepting its reproduction" (Benjamin, 1236). We, as a contemporary mass, do not like unique things. We do not like things that are far away. These are both things that are necessary for an object to maintain its aura. When one hears of some great far away things, one builds up great hopes for this thing only to have them smashed against the wall upon actually seeing the things which one had been dreaming of. I have been using the example of the Mona Lisa because it seems really relevant. One hears so frequently about the greatness of this painting that it has almost become a trope for greatness. And how frequently does one talk to a person who has seen this glorious painting only to have this other person that that "Pictures don't do it justice"? It's because these pictures have taken away the aura of the original. Prof. Graban asked whether or not the pictures need the original. I would say no. The pictures of the Mona Lisa no longer need the Mona Lisa to server their purpose as examples of great art, and other pictures are just representations of reality. Ce n'est pas une pipe.

Cooper Again.

Ok, writing my last post has given me an idea, and I think it's kind of interesting. In the previous post, I talked about at the very end up representation in Cinema. Cooper in her article says there aren't enough black poets.Well, there are black directors. I was looking for something to watch in on demand the other day, and there is commercial thing that was playing. It showed me movies that were available to me. This particular commercial highlighted the genre "Black Cinema". I remember being kind of taken aback by the name. I guess I knew the genre exist, but not by a specific name.

Anyway, just based off the commercials I saw. All the characters in "black cinema" are African American. They are directed by African American directors, and they deal with themes supposedly important to the black community. Cooper might be really excited to see such a thing exist if she were still alive, but I question whether her argument holds up. She seems to think that Blacks would represent themselves more accurately if they were the ones painting themselves. I argue that this is not the case in Black Cinema.

It is important here to note that there is this idea that comes up time and again in our society. That there are things that are "black", things that are "white", thinks that are "gay" , "straight" etc etc.

I have limited experience with Black Cinema, but look at a few examples that I do know

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-GlwowBL_bY

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lFn1SZj59x8

Especially the Undercover Brother trailer. Am I the only one who things maybe they perpetuate stereotypes? Build a caricature?

I think that this is how black people tend to represent themselves in cinema, and it kind of worries me. Not because I think that there is anything wrong with the characters, but because it sort of pigeon holes the black individual. It sends this message "this is what it's like to be black, if you aren't this, you're white."

I don't think this is necessarily what Cooper would have wanted, I think she'd kind of be disappointed, but I really want to know what you guys think about this one. I hope you find it as interesting as I do!

reproducing the cross

Where is the original cross? Walter Benjamin's "The Work of Art in the Age of mechanical Reproduction" raises this question for me. There are many reproductions of the cross but the original is, correct me if I'm wrong, no where to be found. The True Cross, the one Jesus was nailed to, was allegedly found in pieces during during the Byzantine era. Constantine the emperor is responsible for the reproduction of the cross, the image of it becoming popular during his time. But what does it say if there is no original?
Benjamin says that "The presence of the original is the prerequisite of the concept of authenticity," but there is not a true cross to measure this authenticity against (Benjamin 1234). This is not to say that there is no true cross, it is just that no true cross has been discovered in its complete form. So, what is being reproduced? The crosses from Byzantine? Crucifixes from medieval times? There are so many variations of these reproduced crosses out there, ranging from the massive monument at the Valley of the Fallen in Spain to the mock rosary necklaces sold in Rue 21. Would the cross at the Valley of the Fallen be considered an original? Obviously, the mock-rosary necklaces are reproductions, but what exactly are they a reproduction of? Which model of the cross do they use? Since there are so many variations, could it be that these reproductions are actually not reproductions of the original at all but reproductions of the wide range of imaginative ways of constructing the cross?

Thinking about Cooper and the Poetic Tradition

I think that a good way to think about representation is to see characters as images or pictures. This is because authors, whether intentionally or not, create an idea of what a person or people group is like based on the traits of the character. Cooper writes, "they begin by telling you that all colored people look exactly alike and end by noting down every chance contortion or idiosyncrasy as a race characteristic" (382). In this case, Black characters are falsely represented, but the language describing them nevertheless builds an image (in this case a caricature) of the what 'real' black.

It's clear that this false representation takes place, but why does it take place? I think that the building of an image is inherent to the English literary tradition, particularly in poetry. Poets, especially Old English and Renaissance poets, would generally fall into the group that Cooper calls "the preachers". Sidney used a similar word, he said in his "Defense of Poesy" that poets were prophets and makers of worlds. The poet is supposed to be a teacher. Marlowe taught us not to reach too high (Faustus), Jonson taught us to seize the day, Donne's poetry constantly tried to convince someone of something, Milton wrote to "justify the ways of God to men" and explain the state of the world (Paradise Lost). I think it is important to understand that this is how many of these poets saw themselves because it begs the question, "how do poets/writers see themselves in our PoMo society?" because if we still see ourselves as teachers of an audience then it makes sense that writers try to characterizes things they have little understanding of. It's almost like they are building a curriculum.

Poetry isn't the primary form of entertainment anymore. Movies and music have taken over that role in many aspects. Do the directors and musicians still feel a teacher responsibility? I think they do, I think of John Lennon and the song "imagine". And I also think that's where false representation of certain people groups will be found now.

Paul Simon and the aura of live music

Right before I began blogging tonight I had just finished attending an amazing and flawless performance by Paul Simon. While reviewing some passages in Benjamin's essay, "Art in the Age of Mechanical Production," I started to wonder about how the depreciation of the quality of presence in art might relate to one listening to a CD as opposed to attending a live concert. Benjamin, talking about how a work's "copies" can reach environments or situations the original could never on its own, says, "the situations into which the product of mechanical reproduction can be brought may not touch the actual work of art, yet the quality of its presence is always depreciated" (70). This is to say that a reproduction can never be as good as the original, because it lacks the affectation of "historical testimony," and as an object, loses it's authority.

But my question is, so what if you're not seeing the original? In a new age there are new ways of perceiving art as well as literature and any other discourse. Every book we read is written in a past time, then mass reproduced. Hardly anyone comes in contact with the original version of famous novels, yet thousands of people come into contact with the distributed copies. So the original has a more powerful "aura" than the rest, simply because it was written first. But wasn't it also revised and drafted several times before the first copy? I don't know if the original piece is really all that much more significant than the others. With our technology today you can see art through whichever lens you choose. We have programs at our fingertips that allow us to distort our perception of light and shadow to obtain information from a painting that would escape us if we viewed it with the naked eye? The original is important because it is a symbol of a completion of work, but does it really make that much of a difference?

Paul Simon, as you know is part of the duo Simon and Garfunkel. He performed songs from that group as well as choice songs from his own solo albums. I noticed (and a lot of artists do this live) that his melodies were often different from the original recordings. And thinking about it, it makes complete sense for them to change over the years. I figured that as a musician one would keep creating and shaping the song as you aged, even if you wrote it over twenty years ago. So even though he didn't sing it straight through like he does on the CDs, each time he represents a song he does so at that moment, unique from his other performances.

I've just got to say that it was truly a phenomenal performance and if you are not a fan of Paul Simon to seriously check him out on Spotify or iTunes. It was a great feeling to see an artist's presentation of his work right from a stage a few dozen yards in front of me. People will often agree that seeing a band/musician live is better than listening to the mp3 off of your computer.

One question I have to ask about this is, which one is the original - the song that has been introduced to the public, or the same song reproduced in a live performance by the musician himself? Can we compare one to the other, even if they are both in essence, originals?

Enabling the enabler

MTV Shows

While relaxing at home one night, my TV happened to on MTV's new show "Guy Code." During the episode, Vinny from Jersey Shore caught my attention when discussing bottle service. In the above clip from the episode if you fast forward to 2:30, shortly afterwards Vinny states, "Because, like women, they want to feel powerful in a club. You know what I mean? They don't want to feel like groupies that are just hanging out on the floor. So when they're up on a stage or something, women I feel like- like being high up." I immediately thought of de Certeau's "Walking in the City" and his "concept city." Let's not get into a tizzy about what women actually want, or how they actually want to feel, or who "enables" them (sorry Vinny), but focus on the concept of power Vinny introduces and being higher up. By being higher up and not a groupie on the floor, it's like saying women want a purpose (at the club), but don't want to be just anybody at the club, but simultaneously they do want to be at the club because they chose to attend. Also the concept of being higher up as holding power, I feel, corresponds directly to "Voyeurs or Walkers" section of de Certeau's text.

"The desire to see the city preceded the means of satisfying it" (1343). This particular quote made me ask, is the city merely a representation of desire? If one initially thought of composing a story, then sat down and started typing, wouldn't the story be the representation of the initial thought or idea? After lolling around in this messy theory, I decided that in order for there to be presentation, there has to be an audience (duh). However, if you spoke to somebody next to you, even though your words are a presentation to for the person, to the listener they are representative because they are instantly translated by the listener into their own language and understanding which is no longer yours. The agency of representation is in the copy, the agency is the identification process, identification with initial presentation. By saying this I am creating a furious infinity of re/presentation that holds similarities with the question, "Which came first, the chicken or the egg?" Representation holds an air of "secondary" about it, but not necessarily fully dependent upon the initial things, tangents are proof of this (I dub myself the queen of tangents). I believe presentations can build things concepts/theories/buildings/etc, but also guide for the development of something completely original, an implicit prompt if you will.

Erasure of Identity

Reading Butler's article, the idea that sticks out most to me is the problematic notion of the "universal" definition of "woman," (4) and how this all encompassing view point may ask women to put a priority on their identities as women over the other identities of race, class, etc. Butler writes that "gender is not always constituted coherently in different historical contexts, and because gender intersects with racial, class, ethnic, sexual, and regional modalities...as a result, it becomes impossible to separate out 'gender' from the...intersections in which it is invariably produced and maintained" (4-5). She is trying to say here that the label of "woman" is not a singular thing that can be isolated within a person's identity and when universal feminists try to call to all woman to look over their differences and to unite as women, this erases the other various identities that make up a person.

Intersectionality is important to feminist debate because as Butler states, it is not true that "the oppression of women has some singular form discernible in the universal or hegemonic structure of patriarchy or masculine domination" (5). Not all women are subject to the same methods of oppression in Western and non-Western cultures and to assume so is to limit our understanding of other cultures. The solution to one symptom is not necessarily the best and only solution to the array of problems that stem from patriarchy.

Terministic Screens and Iconicity

Burke brings about the concept of the "terministic screen" as a device that he says is used in part to "direct the attention (45)." Burke notes, in regard to terministic screens, "Here the kind of deflection I have in mind concerns simply the fact that any nomenclature necessarily directs the attention into some channels rather than others (45)," The way that something, whether it be language or the photo example that Burke talks about, is framed can direct the attention to a certain feature or aspect making it seem like the prominent feature of the whole body of work. Basically, the same event can have multiple interpretations based on what type of filter one puts on it. The terministic screen is but one more facet that adds to the what we in the class have discussed about the fragility of interpretation. It seems that in theory according to Burke, the terministic screen acts as the very first step of interpretation. Burke uses an example of three different terminologies of interpreting human behavior and notes that, "even something so 'objectively there' as behavior must be observed through one or another kind of terministic screen, that directs the attention in keeping the nature (49)." There is no way to understand behavior, or any other phenomena for that reason, unless it is first given a filter to narrow its scope. Human life is far to vast to "correctly" and "completely" explain in one try, so terministic screens are used to give some clarity and make sense of things, even if multiple screens can be correct at the same time.

When I was first thinking about terministic screens, I thought about McCloud's theory of icons and images, and how emphasis can be put on different images withing a drawing. McCloud says that human faces can be made very general and simple while the setting might be quite detailed and elaborate in order to make the viewer identify with the character in the drawing. This would be a type of terministic screen in many ways. That connection alone made me think about terministic screens in a different way as well. McCloud and Burke are referring to the same basic concept, but using a different filter or screen to present the idea, and both of them make sense. This could be said about many of the readings we have discussed in this class. The terministic screen might be the most central aspect of interpretaion, no matter what name you want to give to it.

Representation and Catagorization (Burke+Butler)

Coincidentally enough, a test that I am currently studying for in a psychology class (no, I am not fully prepared yet!) details how categorization functions in the human psyche. Wading through Butler's essay Gender Trouble (and prompted by the discussion questions for tomorrow) I began to think about how categorization and representation are associated. To categorize something, anything (such as gender) is to associate it with other, similarly represented ideas, objects, etc. But this creates boarders, because in categorization, you not only draw upon similarities, but also upon differences as well. From Burkes "Terministic Screens" and Butler's piece, it seems evident to me that representation is based upon catagorization, and thus, paradoxically wedged between similarity and difference. Try and stick with me here, I'm going to try and do my best (these are not easy theories to fuse!)

Burke states in "Terministic Screens" that "All terminologies must implicitly or explicitly embody choices between the principle of continuity and discontinuity" (Burke 50). Terminologies, such as gender, must work within a screen, a categorization, that either associates or disassociates them. "Basically, there are two kinds of terms: terms that put things together, and terms that take things apart" (Burke 49). It is reasonable to infer from his theories that catagorization (association and disassociation) permits language to function as symbolic action. Building off my previous blog post, I would venture to say that Burke's terministic screens function as a means means to categorize.

Butler seems to have a problem with this relatively simple dichotomy when it comes to gender, though. Why? Because the construction of gender, and feminine identity, cannot adequately be captured by simple catagorization, or representation for that matter. In fact, it seems that categorizing femininity at all upsets Butler. Further, the representation of gender and femininity is undermined by it too. Butler states that "by comforming to a requirement of representational politics that feminism articulate a stable subject, feminism thus opens itself to charges of gross misrepresentation" (Butler 7). The (mis)representation (another paradox to think about!) of feminism in politics, literature and discourse has been doomed by the human practice of association.

I think the real question that these two essays cast light upon is the question of whether or not representation can operate without categorization. Let me know what you think!

Ownership of Aura

With our group circle on Friday, we kept throwing the term "aura" around rather loosely. The term we were using did not seem to hold as much meaning as the definition that was given to us on the backgrounder. When a picture is reproduced, we ultimately decided that the original was needed as a reference for the copy to have any meaning (aura) whatsoever. Not to beat a dead horse here, but I feel as if I didn't quite understand how that could be possible. When our group decided this, does it mean that both copies need to be present when we interpret them, or do we, as readers, need to have common knowledge of the original before reviewing the copy of the original?

I'm going to assume we're talking about the latter, which leads me to think of irony. Now, I'm not thinking of irony as if there is a "we" and a "them," but rather in the sense that there must be common knowledge of a concept, otherwise misunderstanding will occur. Can aura work in this same way, or does aura have a different meaning for each person? I guess the ownership of aura really has me confused. Is the author the only one who can see the true aura of an original, or does the author "die" in this case, and leave the aura up to interpretation?

Fluid Views of Gender

Miranda's post on Butler has made me consider the interplay between historical context and gender. In "Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire," Butler asks, "If gender is constructed, could it be constructed differently, or does its constructedness imply some form of social determinism, foreclosing the possibility of agency and transformation?" (11). Constructed or not, I hardly think the possibility of agency and transformation has been foreclosed. In fact, it seems to me that present-day analysis of gender had become especially fluid, far more than just ten years ago.

"The distinction between sex and gender," writes Butler, "serves the argument that whatever biological intractability sex appears to have, gender is culturally constructed: hence, gender is neither the causal result of sex nor as seemingly fixed as sex" (8). One way of interpreting this point is to say that only when constructions change does the way gender acts change. Short of surgery sex may be intractable, but gender is far from it, and there are signs of society adapting to gender's increasing distance from sex.

A recent and stark example of this is last month's news that a transgendered child was accepted into the Colorado Girl Scouts. Although Bobby Montoya was initially rejected from joining the organization on the basis that "it doesn't matter how he looks, he has boy parts, he can't be in Girl Scouts." After Bobby's mother went to the press, Girl Scouts claimed a representative had misinformed Bobby, saying, "If a child identifies as a girl and the child's family presents her as a girl, Girl Scouts of Colorado welcomes her as a Girl Scout." Somehow, I don't believe Girl Scouts in any state would have accepted Bobby in my own Brownie days.

Language/Society Influence Paradox

(I want to set the scene, so I'll be dramatic.)

When walking home this afternoon between Ballantine and the Chemistry building, I heard a muffle of bird-calls and the flutter of wings. I looked up towards the knotty limbs to see a murder of charcoal crows. I was alone. They outnumbered me, taunted me with "caws". Their presence high above me was ominous and intimidating. In a quick recollection of "The Birds", I imagined them ascending downwards and, out of some evil spite, viciously pecking my eyes out and. I mean, it was a possibility. And then I thought, how clever of Alfred Hitchcock, to market on a so obviously dark and oppressive image, to put to film the morbid symbolism of the looming crow murder.

And suddenly I was struck, though not by the birds, but rather a question of fleeting agency. Why did I think this mass of black birds in a tree was ominous, grim, oppressive? Was this symbolism so "obvious" or inherent? Or rather was it the act of watching the film itself that set conjured this later symbolism? And yes, it is most definitely a question of agency. Did I get to freely decide the negative significance of these crows? Or did Hitchcock decide for me when I watched "The Birds" for years ago?

This is also a question of influence. As Bakhtin states in "Discourse in the Novel", language (and this would include film) is a "social phenomenon", and the text of a work like "The Birds" is shaped by certain cultural codes at that historical time. This would mean that Alfred Hitchcock's decisions to make the film, what its themes or symbols will be, etc. are based of off societal modes, as he is a member of society and is of course effected by what's around him. And so "The Birds" as a film, and specifically the ominous symbol of a murder of crows, is not the single and authorial creative idea of Hitchcock (this echoes the Barthes and Foucault ideas of no "Author", but rather a society created work). It is the echo of the cultural codes of the present time and what has come before it (maybe Hitchcock was inspired by a Poe poem or what not). The language and symbolism of "The Birds" was influenced by society.

And then my realization proved to me a paradox. If Hitchcock's symbols incepted in me the idea of some dark avian horror image, then wasn't I influenced by his work, by his language? Put in a larger sense then, is society further influenced by language (by symbols, themes, and stigmas in pre-existing books, films, photos, etc.)? Thus language and symbols are simultaneously influencee and influencer, creating an ongoing chain: society influences language, which influences society, which influences language, and on.

If so than who really has agency? As symbol-usage progresses and grows more complex do we (as members of society) lose agency? Put more simply, if everything already stands for something, then how can we create, make things signify other things outside of the realm of past signification-influences? With this dynamic, the paradox of influence, it would seem that we are in a continuos cycle of symbol-usage, diluting agency and creativity, blending together "influencing" and "being influenced" to the point where nothing is completely "new" (and eventually not even relatively new).

Identification and Re/Presentation

In this re/presentation unit, Cooper and Butler seem to me to specifically challenge McCloud’s assertions about universal representation in cartoon images. McCloud specifically argues that it is the simplicity of cartoon images that allows them to appeal to a large number of people. A simpler image represents more people and allows for more people to "identify" with the cartoon character. However, Cooper and Butler address the problems of overly simplified representation and complicate for me McCloud's theory.

Anna Julia Cooper’s piece causes me to question the limits of McCloud’s theory of the universality of cartoon imagery. Cooper writes that she feels writers have not accurately represented black men and women. I wish that McCloud had taken up the complications that race and gender bring to his theory. When he introduces the idea of simplification for amplification and identification, his examples of faces, except for the very last, the most simplified, are all clearly white males. I am curious whether the simplified white male face can cause the same level of identification in the reader who is not male or not white. I suppose I am questioning, can a person be represented by an image that does not reflect him- or herself?

Cooper questions universal re/presentation: while she does not have cartoon images in mind, she does question the ability of a writer to represent accurately and with complexity a group he or she isn’t part of. Cooper writes that the black person as a free citizen hasn’t yet been portrayed. “It is my opinion that the canvas awaits the brush of the colored man himself” (382). She also writes that Caucasian barristers cannot put themselves in the place of Black men, who in turn cannot represent the voice of the Black woman. Cooper argues that one of these demographics cannot represent the voice of the other. A Black person as the subject of a re/presentation is best represented by someone of the same gender and race, who also has the correct literary intentions. A person of a different race/gender may possible re/present well, but it is tough.

In “Gender Trouble,” Butler addresses the problems that arise when representation is too universal – that is, one label or characteristic is assume to represent or to foster identification between large numbers of people. Women do not necessarily identify with other women because of their shared gender. “Woman” does not invoke a solidarity of identity (Butler 8). Re/presentation of the subject of feminism (women) as universal has caused false identification or reductive identification. Butler might take issue with Cooper’s assertion about the need for genders and races to represent themselves. If someone does not identify with others of his/her race or gender, can the re/presentation be accurate or nuanced?

The question of who can represent who, and how faithfully, is one that is linked to identification. I am much more comfortable being represented by a group or a person with whom I identify than by a group/person with whom I do not identify. Reading Cooper and Butler together would seem to suggest that the best re/presentation comes from an understanding of the subject, or perhaps from identification between the subject and the re/presenter.

The Value of Originality

After reading Burke's Terministic Screens and talking in class, I started thinking more about the value of originality. The class seems to be circulating around the question of what determines whether something is worth reproducing, editing, critiquing, etc. and what effect that outside influence bears on the original. It would seem that an original should stand on its own, and I had previously not given much thought to loss of integrity any piece of art, literature, or creative expression experiences after getting sifted through the public eye. However, there are definite ways that an original is changed even in the act of interpretation.

The two ways that stuck out to me came from Benjamin and Burke. Benjamin, in The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, frames interpretations in terms of how they are framed more in a literal sense, as mechanical reproductions of works of art attempt to be accurate and transcend that issue of time and space. Burke takes a different perspective as he looks at how the original nuts and bolts (terms) can be used in different ways for vastly different outcomes of interpretation. What I got from these theorists is that is comes down to a question of intention. Burke and Benjamin both deal renovations of things that already exist, but Benjamin is interested in maintaining integrity while Burke is more interested in new ways of seeing old works.

This can best be understood in comparing how they deal with the reproduction of photography. Benjamin is extremely concerned with maintaining at least a semblance of the integrity of the original as he writes, "technical reproduction can put the copy of the original into situations which would be out of reach for the original itself . . . the situations in which the product of mechanical reproduction can be brought may not touch the actual work of art, yet the quality of its presence is always depreciated"(1235). In contrast, Burke writes, "When I speak of 'terministic screens,' I have particularly in mind some photographs I once saw. They were different photographs of the same objects, the difference being that they were made with different color filters"(45). Benjamin is conscious of the depreciation and sees something of a misfortune in it, while Burke much more embraces the difference and mutability of "something so 'factual' as a photograph," as he puts it.

So does the integrity of an original suffer in reinterpretations or is glorified in the appreciation of other artists to portray it in different ways? I'm still not sure, but I think there is value in maintaining an awareness of the original with its historical context and original interpretation, otherwise we would end up in a world of creative mutability lacking in the hierarchy that often inspires artists to create in the first place.

Butler is Confusing...

I had a lot of trouble understanding the Butler article, I think because it was sort of providing a view of sex and gender that was much more complex than what I had previously been led to believe. However, there was one area that I think I understood...Butler states, "The urgency of feminism to establish a universal status for patriarchy in order to strengthen the appearance of feminism's own claims to be representative has occasionally motivated the shortcut to a categorical or fictive universality of the structure of domination, held to produce women's common subjugated experience" (5). It seems that Butler is saying that feminists place themselves in a sort of identity box as a byproduct of the way that they place their adversaries in a box so that they can present a united front against them, if that makes sense. Thus, the whole idea of "woman" and the united identity that this is supposed to entail might be little more than the attempt to create an identity that will challenge the presumably singular identity of the patriarchy.

It seems that what Butler is doing here, then, is providing a discussion of how this singular identity, or any identity based on gender or sex, is not viable if we conceive of gender/sex as uniquely cultural or biological. Rather, culture informs the way that we formulate ideas about our biology, and therefore sex cannot exist without a cultural conception of sex (what we call gender). She states that, "gender is also the discursive/cultural means by which 'sexed nature'...is produced and established as 'prediscursive,' prior to culture..." (10). So it seems here that gender is something that acts, rather than something that simply is. Rather than being a category, gender is a "set of relations" (13) that acts upon the body in culture to create its sex. This is similar to the way that Miller conceives of genre, as a relationship between texts in different historical moments...So, I guess this rambling is all leaving me wondering what the relationship between gender and historical context is. If texts change throughout time, and create a genre system that is dynamic, what does this say about how people change over time? Or is this not even a valid question?

Burke's Web of Symbols and the Need for Terministic Screens

While we did not get a chance to delve too deep into discussion regarding Burke's "Terministic Screens," I found his viewpoints on symbolic action and the dramatistic approach to language particularly interesting in terms of the re/presentation paradox. Specifically, Burke's analysis of language as dramatic (or action related) rather than simply "scientistic" (or conveying informaton) is one that I would like to take some time discussing here on the blog. While reading this piece, I began to question how language is used as a representation of action rather than merely meaning something to a reader. For Burke, this is a central claim in describing the dramatistic function of language, or "language as act" and further language as symbolic-action.

Language is a web of symbolic action, it initiates action rather than simply representing meaning. But what does this imply about language and how it functions in culture and communication? While literary theory and language was the theorists focus, his ideas regarding language as action oriented had much broader implications. Burke approached language as "equipment for living" a tool that is a necessity for communication and further, the construction of reality for human beings. Caught in a web of symbols, language serves to form our perceptions, an active agent that underscores our understanding of the world around us. Burke asserts that reality has been mostly constructed through this symbol system. "What is our 'reality' for today but all this clutter of symbols about the past....And however important to us is the tiny sliver of reality each of us has experienced firsthand, the whole overall 'picture' is but a construct of our symbol systems" (Burke 48). This is quite a claim, but for Burke it doesn't seem like too much of a stretch. Language does not simply represent meaning, it is a system of symbols that is accountable for our entire understanding of reality outside of perception. Woah.

As Burke states over and over, humans are a symbol using animal. Not simply in motion, but in action. But in this web of the symbol system, how does the individual navigate this web and sort out these symbols, many of which can mean different things in different contexts? This is where the "terministic screen" comes into play for Burke. Similar to a frame, the terministic screen serves to direct our attention within a certain context. "We need terministic screens, since we cant say anything without the use of terms; whatever terms we use, they necessarily constitute a corresponding kind of screen; and any such screen necessarily directs the attention to one field rather than another" (50). The screen serves as a map, directing the individual to the proper action of the term used. Without the map, language could not be a representation of a symbol or an action. Without terministic screens, the symbol using animal would be lost in the web of symbols.

The Authority of the Object

It seemed like we were having some difficulty unpacking just what Benjamin was talking about in his essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction" in class. I'd like to bring in another complicating factor that we might not really have discussed much: the "authority of the object." Benjamin states that, "what is really jeopardized when the historical testimony is affected is the authority of the object" (1235). And "historical testimony rests on the authenticity," the particular quality of a work of art as a unique original that exists in times and places unique to itself.

So, if a work is reproduced, then it does not have a link to the unique history of the original, and therefore dilutes the "authority" that that object has in its particular time and place? It seems that reproductions, by putting images of the original in different contexts, would undermine the strength of the original context of a work. Although we were discussing the ways in which reproduced objects can have auras of their own, can exist to broaden the affect of a certain artwork, it seems as though Benjamin is almost speaking against reproductions as legitimate artworks, because they are separate from/dilute original historical context.

So time and place are clearly essential for a work of art to be original, and an artwork has more "authority," more clout as an original, if it is not reproduced. Benjamin goes on to discuss how this originality is linked to tradition: "The uniqueness of a work of art is inseparable from its being imbedded in the fabric of tradition" (1236). Here it seems that Benjamin is implying that history is essential along with usefulness. An artwork needs to have a function within history to motivate its existence, and reproductions do not fulfill this same function. In fact, perhaps they undermine not only the historical specificity of a piece, but its usefulness as an object of ritual as well.

Although it seems to me that there is a sort of negative tone to much of what Benjamin says about reproductions, and their part in the decay of the aura, the spreading and diluting of the "authority of the object" is not necessarily all bad. While it may make the original artwork less original, in a way, it does allow for multiple historical interpretations for a piece, that would not necessarily be possible otherwise. It seems that reproduction creates something similar to the "death of the Author" that Barthes discussed, carrying this idea further to the "death of the Original..."

Butler & Burke: Creating Observations, Creating the Subject

As I read Judith Butler's "Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire" (for the 64th time), I was struck by a parallel between her theorizing and Burke's.

In discussing the 'question of the subject', and especially its pertinence for feminist politics, Butler writes, "Juridical power inevitably 'produces' what it claims merely to represent" (Butler 3). She refers to this as the 'dual function of power,' the ability to create what it represents. This reminded me also of French theorist Louis Althusser's concept of interpellation, in which a subject is interpellated as such under a larger institution of power (ideological state apparatuses). I.e., a woman might be interpellated as a woman by the medical industry, and that definition carries certain notions with it, and the way that person is dealt with- whether or not they self-identify as a woman- will reflect those notions.

Of course, we see a similar 'dual power' in Burke's discussion of terministic screens. He writes, "Not only does the nature of our terms affect the nature of our observations, in the sense that the terms direct the attention to one field rather than to another. Also, many of the 'observations' are but implications of the particular terminology in terms of which the observations are made" (Burke 46). I guess this seems pretty self-evident; after all, if I read Persepolis for an art history class about drawing style in comics, I would discover much different things- and have a much different reading experience in general- than the discoveries and experiences I had reading it for this class.

It seems to me that all three of these theorists have implications for the agency of the reader (and perhaps the writer and the text as well?) by acknowledging the seemingly simple truth that attention must be directed, and directed attention creates specific subjects. And furthermore, I wonder if the concept of interpellation could be applied to literature- possibly genre could be a way of interpellating if an author writes within a specific genre and creates a specific audience by doing so?

Art Representing Art

Art lovers adore talking up the original. It's yet another way to elevate yourself, to in some way rise above the ordinary millions, to set yourself apart. For, say, antique collectors, it may be owning an original Tiffany lamp; for music aficionados, perhaps it's seeing Fleetwood Mac, before and after they broke up. Personally, I've only experienced this in a more removed sense. Last year, I went to the British Museum and felt my heart flutter to see such treasures as Shakespeare's First Folio and some Beatles lyrics handwritten by John Lennon and George Harrison. I thought it would be like this whenever I went to see some famous artwork in person, and often, it was. Seeing the Sistine Chapel in the Vatican or the David at the Galleria dell'Accademia in Florence were two of the most amazing moments from my study abroad year.

Then I went to the Louvre in Paris and, naturally, had to go look at da Vinci's Mona Lisa. Rather than the wave of awe I had come to expect, I felt disappointed. It may have been the frustration with the crowd in the overly packed room (the Mona Lisa has a hall to itself) or it could have been the fact that by that point I had been to been to a dozen splendid museums, five of them in the last week, and my sensory input was exhausted. But really, I think my dissatisfaction had more to do with the fact that, quite simply, I had seen it already.

Benjamin writes in "The Art of Mechanical Reproduction": "The situation into which the product of mechanical reproduction can be brought may not touch the actual work of art, yet the quality of its presence is always depreciated" (1235). Search "Mona Lisa" in Google Images, and beside several color-damaged copies you'll find many distortions and parodies of da Vinci's original painting. These may be thought of as effects on the historical testimony surrounding the original, insofar as "historical testimony rests on authenticity" (1235). Benjamin notes, too, that "what is really jeopardized when the historical testimony is affected is the authority of the object" (1235). The Mona Lisa, as the most famous artwork of one of the most famous artists, lends authority to other media that constantly uses its image--for example, a flier for a student club or an advertisement for flights to France. But for every use, its authority is diminished a little bit more.

By the time I saw the Mona Lisa for myself, its authenticity had been reduced so that it had reversed places with the affecters; the original seemed to be the copy, the representation of other, inauthentic art.

By contrast, less ubiquitous (but still well-known) art was more exciting to me. While visiting the Belvedere in Vienna, I turned the corner and saw Napoleon Crossing the Alps, and my delight here was, against all expectation, greater than when seeing the Mona Lisa.

Seriously, I think this can be found in any history textbook published since the dawn of color print.