A Continual Paradox with Aristotle and "Feeling"

Upon my first read through of Nicomachean Ethics, I was troubled by the notion that perhaps I wasn't "wordly" enough to truly grasp Aristotle's argument. My second attempt confirmed this, and on my third attempt, I began to somewhat wrap my head around pieces of what his contradictions were implying about human beings and society.

My questioning thought at this time, though, is his stance on "feeling" (9). Feeling, being such a generic and vastly general term, can pertain to almost anything. But feeling in the sense that happiness is a "feeling," and "feeling" goodness are two entirely separate entities. He argues that "Moral Science may be of great value to those who guide their desires and actions by principle" (9). While I am not disputing that particular statement, it just seems that individuals would first need to feel their desires to even understand that they have desire. I kept going around in circles because of the contradictory principles.

Perhaps it's the word "feeling" that has gotten me all riled up. Can a person feels virtuous, which can bring happiness, (although not in all cases, such as the example Aristotle gives about the man who cannot achieve total happiness if he has "suffer[ed] the greatest misery and misfortune (15)) or must that person just be virtuous without having the sensation of being "worth" something?