He takes further time to lay out what goodness is not, making distinctions between classes of people. Aristotle does not hesitate to diminish the idea of Good as pleasure, affirming it as the lowest of ideas. "The generality of men and the most vulgar," he writes, "identify the Good with pleasure...and with the Life of Enjoyment" (13). Such men he compares to cattle, as their good (not to be mistaken for the Good) is not acquired through any kind of political activity.
Higher up the hierarchy of goods is "men of refinement," for they "and men of action think that the Good is honor" (15). Aristotle does not accept this, as he believes that "the Good must be something proper to its possessor and not easy to be taken away from him" (15). Honor, being a thing that is not innate to a person but bestowed on them via the recognition of another, cannot be Aristotle's idea of the Good. Honor remains merely a 'good,' lower-case g.
Lastly he dismisses the concept of an Ideal Good, as it may not be "practicable or attainable by man." Instead, he argues that the ultimate Good to be sought (whatever that may be) should be "a good within human reach." An Ideal Good is not servicable; Good must be realistic and demonstrable. He does acknowledge the plausibility that "having the Ideal Good as a pattern we shall know more easily what things are good for us, and knowing them, obtain them" (25). Yet, ultimately, awareness of an Ideal Good does not fit into Aristotle's concern that scientific procedure determine the strategies for achieving Good. It seems, then, that underlying Aristotle's idea of Good is the potential for continuing discovery of what Good is or will be.