I was recently reading an article about female genital cutting (FGC) in Sudan for another class, that reminded me of some of the problems of comprehension that Locke talks about in "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding." The author of the article about FGC, Ellen Gruenbaum, describes a group of mothers stating that they will practice "sunna" circumcision, a more moderate type of genital cutting which does not include infibulation (the suturing up of part or all of the labia). However, they state that they will still "close a little" when their daughters are circumcised. Gruenbaum states, "But by labeling it 'sunna' they seem to believe they are avoiding the sinful of forbidden (haram) form..." (416). This seems to be an instance where people are actually attempting to change the correctness of their actions by changing the definition of a word. If they label the type of circumcision they are planning to do "sunna" circumcision, they believe there is some "rightness" conferred by the name, even if the act is still one that is what others would call infibulation.
This seems to be an example of what Locke is talking about when he says that language doesn't work well "when any word does not excite in the hearer the same idea which it stands for in the mind of the speaker" (817). The women who describe their more severe practices as "sunna" circumcision are using this disconnect to their advantage (even though this might be a somewhat unintentional molding of language to fit their practices), rather than doing it by accident as Locke seems to suggest is most common. Therefore, do words really fail in this situation? Certainly, they are used in a way that results from/causes a different idea in the mind of the speaker than that of the hearer, but this is because of a particular intent. Is language really failing when it fulfills its motive, then, even if this motive is to misuse language?
Source: "Honorable Mutilation? Changing Responses to Female Genital Cutting in Sudan," Ellen Gruenbaum
Miranda,
ReplyDeleteI think this is a really interesting application of Locke's principle. The last question you present, about language failing if motive is a misuse of language really stuck out to me. On page 819, during his discussion of moral words, Locke mentions that certain words have "complex ideas they stand for" and those meanings are "either beholden to the explication of others, or...are left to [one's] own observation and industry" (Locke 819). I think this is an important concept to consider when thinking of the topic of FGC. As you mentioned, just because the act the is being referred to by a different term, does not mean that it is no longer a similar act; it just does not hold the same meaning to those involved. Also, I think this idea could also be interesting to apply to McCloud in the sense that words hold different meanings based on the cultural interpretation of them.