Some Criticism of New Criticism

In reading some of my fellow classmates thoughts regarding New Criticism and the Wimsatt and Beardsley piece The Intentional Fallacy, I know that I am not the only one that objects to some of the basic assumptions carried by the scholars and the movement of New Criticism. For a refresher, I would like to quickly revisit the underlying goal of this movement. According to the Bedford Glossary, The New Criticism movement of that began in the 1940's treats texts "as self-contained and self referential and thus based their interpretations on elements within the text rather than on external factors such as the effects of the work or biographical and historical materials." (Bedford Glossary 335). From our previous studies, I understand and fully contend that the language used in texts is interpretive and largely dependent upon the reader, I simply have trouble buying the claim that texts can be "self referential" and free from analysis of biographical and historical influences. While it is hard to take a stand against notable Yale professors and critics such as Wimatt and Beardsley, I just dont buy their claims and assumptions. First off, I would like to call into question the authors comparison between poetry, pudding and a machine. Wimsatt and Beardsley state in The Intentional Fallacy that "Judging a poem is like judging a pudding or a machine. One demands that it work. It is only because an artifact works that we infer the intention of an artifact. A poem should not mean, but be" (Wimsatt & Beardsley 811). I don't mean to come off as argumentative, but the comparision between poetry and a pudding or a machine seems to be a bit (well, a lot) of a stretch. I agree that poetry must "work" but pudding and a machine are not created or conceived in the manner that literature is. Poetry works as a form of expression, a intellectual and emotion creation genre that bares the marking of its creator. How can you analyze poetry, or any type of literature, without at least considering the emotions and intentions of the author, as well as the influence of the authors experiences in a historical framework. Without these considerations, literature as expression and its social implications are lost, negating the authorial purpose of the work.

I would also like to call into question the claim within The Intentional Fallacy that poetry, and literature, is public. "The poem belongs to the public. It is embodied in language, the peculiar possession of the public, and it is about the human being, an object of public knowledge" (812). Poetry, however, is not always public, and is not always intended for public eyes. So if a poem or a poet's works are unknown, does that take away from the fact that it is a work of literature? Take the case of Emily Dickinson, without a doubt one of the most beloved American poets to this day. None of her poetry was found or published until after her death. It could be argued that she never intended for any individual to read her work. Of course, the interpretation of her work is now "public knowledge" but her poetry is private. It details her emotions and experiences as a woman in a patriarchal society. Not only should her poetry be read as such, but it should be treated as if it was never meant to meet the eye of anyone but herself. Further, reading Dickinson without biographical and historical considerations takes away from the "meaning" and "being" of her work.