J.L. Austin says of performative speech, “It seems clear that to utter [performative statements] is not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it” (682). He gives examples of performative speech, like saying “I do” in a wedding, betting, or bequeathing things to others. The statement must be part of doing the action stated.
It is possible to examine the Pledge of Allegiance as a declarative performative statement. When one says the pledge of allegiance (assuming one both understands and is sincere) one is promising loyalty and support to the US. Just as a reminder, here are the words:
I pledge allegiance to the flag
Of the United States of America
And to the republic for which is stands,
One nation under God, indivisible,
With liberty and justice for all.
To promise something is a performative act, as is to pledge. An issue in this case, however, is ambiguity. The Pledge of Allegiance is different from the performative act, “I promise to do the dishes immediately after dinner.” What exactly does it mean to “pledge allegiance?” Does it mean the pledge-er must take an active role in further demonstrating allegiance to the US? Does it mean simply not doing anything that would disprove one’s allegiance to the US? It’s a rather Locke-like question – What does allegiance signify?
Locke addresses the signification of words - both words that represent simple and complex ideas. However, what is the signification of a performative act? It may be quite different that what all of the words within the act signify. Austin would probably say that the act signifies what it does. That is, “I do,” within a certain context signifies marriage. The signification of the performative act is in a one-to-one relationship with the concept it represents (though the concept itself may be a mixed mode). This is not the case with the Pledge of Allegiance. This performative speech act is not in a one-to-one relationship because it represents multiple mixed modes – there ideas in the Pledge are complex and represent many ideas put together (Locke 818).
Locke writes of complex ideas represented by "murder" and "sacrilege" that these "can never be known from things themselves: there may be parts of those complex ideas which are not visible in the actions itself" (818). I suppose the same holds true for complex performative acts: one person's signification of the act of saying the Pledge of Allegiance does not signify all sayings, but in this case the issue is further complicated. If someone says to me, "Pledge of Allegiance," I think of a bunch of kids saying this in a schoolroom, rather than thinking of what the Pledge is supposed to mean. Someone else might actually think about what the saying the Pledge of allegiance - making the act, if you will - means. I cannot satisfyingly synthesize Locke and Austin to come up with a theory on the signification of performative acts.
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